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“A Guantánamo on the Sea”:
The Difficulty of Prosecuting
Pirates and Terrorists
Eugene Kontorovich†
No one wants a Guantánamo on the sea.1
— Franz Josef Jung, German Defense Minister
They can’t stop us—we know international law.2
— Jama Ali, a Somali pirate
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2008, an epidemic of piracy broke out in the Gulf of
Aden, off the Horn of Africa, with record numbers of ships attacked and
captured.3 The magnitude of the problem generated a response that on the
surface appears to be a model of international cooperation. An unprecedented
naval force, spearheaded by the United States and with contributions from a
Copyright © 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of
their publications.
† Associate Professor, Northwestern University Law School. The author thanks Steven Art
for his extraordinary assistance in researching this Essay, and the Global Law Forum at the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs for its support for an earlier version of this project. Avi Bell,
Evan Criddle, Gregory McNeal, and Bernard Oxman provided helpful comments. This Essay was
selected for presentation at the National Security Law Junior Scholar’s Workshop at the
University of Texas, sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and at the
American Association of Law Schools annual meeting. Special thanks go to the commentators and
other participants.
1. See Germany Calls for International Court to Prosecute Pirates, FoxNews.com, Dec.
23, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,471804,00.html (explaining why nations today
are reluctant to act against pirates).
2. Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates Outmaneuver Warships off Somalia, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15,
2008, at A6 (“Even if foreign navies nab some members of his crew, Mr. Jama said, he is not
worried. He said his men would probably get no more punishment than a free ride back to the
beach.”).
3. In 2008, the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce
reported an “unprecedented” wave of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, with 111 recorded attacks. See
ICC Commercial Crime Services, IMB Reports Unprecedented Rise in Maritime Hijackings, Jan.
16, 2009, http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=332:imbreports-unprecedented-rise-in-maritime-hijackings&catid=60:news&Itemid=51.
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dozen nations, assembled in the Gulf of Aden.4 The U.N. Security Council
unanimously authorized the use of force against pirates even in sovereign
Somali territory.5 These developments could be seen as a high point for a new
international legal order. Yet the international response has failed to control the
outbreak of piracy.6 The countries policing the Gulf of Aden refuse to attack
and often even to arrest the pirates. As the U.S. National Security Council
wrote, “Somali-based piracy is flourishing because it is . . . nearly consequence-free.”7
The international law regarding piracy provides a uniquely favorable
framework for its suppression. Under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction,
which for centuries applied only to piracy, any nation can capture and try
pirates it finds on the high seas.8 Yet none of the countries patrolling the coast
of Somalia have chosen to exercise this authority.9 The frigates routinely
apprehend pirates in the act, only to let them go. In at least one case, a North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) warship came across suspected pirates in
a broken boat and, pursuant to international norms concerning “distressed
mariners,” gave them a tow back to port.10 Several European nations have
instructed their navies not to make any arrests.11 As a result, a few thousand
largely illiterate brigands from one of the world’s poorest countries have
managed, with little more than small arms and rocket-propelled grenades

4. Mike Pfanz, Somali Pirate Attacks “Set to Increase” as Monsoon Eases, Telegraph
(U.K.), July 27, 2009.
5. See S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008); S.C. Res.
1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16,
2008).
6. See, e.g., Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., Op-Ed., Piracy Is Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
2008, at A33 (observing that the question whether “the Somali pirates [are] ordinary criminals, or
a quasi-military force . . . . has virtually paralyzed the navies called to police the Gulf of Aden”).
7. National Security Council, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa:
Partnership & Action Plan 12 (2008) [hereinafter “Countering Piracy”].
8. The high seas are all parts of the sea not included in states’ internal waters or territorial
waters, which extend out 12 nautical miles, and the exclusive economic zone, which extends out
200 miles. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 3, 56(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397, 400, 418 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. For purposes relevant to piracy, the high seas
regime applies to the exclusive economic zone as well. See id. art. 56(1) (describing limited
sovereign rights to natural resources in EEZ), art. 58(2).
9. See, e.g., John Helmer, Navies Stumped over Pirates off Somalia, Bus. Day, June 3,
2009, available at http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=72374 (describing
Russia’s unwillingness to use its universal jurisdiction statute against captured Somali pirates).
10. Bent Mikkelsen, Pirates Keep the Absalon Busy, Shipping Gazette, Nov. 21, 2008,
available
at
http://www.shipgaz.com/old/magazine/issues/2008/22/article2.php;
Jeffrey
Gettleman, Somalia’s Pirates Flourish in a Lawless Nation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 2008, at A1; see
also UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 98(1)(a)–(b).
11. See Gettleman, supra note 10; Justin Stares, Pirates Protected from EU Task Force by
Human Rights, Telegraph (London), Nov. 19, 2008; Marie Woolf, Pirates Can Claim UK
Asylum, Times Online, Apr. 13, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/
article3736239.ece.
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(RPGs),12 to shrug off the efforts of an overwhelming naval force.13 The piracy
epidemic worsened steadily even after the global armada assembled in the Gulf
in late 2008.14
As former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the U.N.
Security Council, international law provides “sufficient legal authority with
which to apprehend and prosecute pirates.”15 What is lacking, said Secretary
Rice, is the “political will and capacity.”16 Various second-order international
legal rules, norms, and expectations pull in the opposite direction, frustrating
antipiracy efforts. International rules make detention and prosecution so costly
that setting pirates loose seems preferable.17
Many of the legal issues that prevent states from effectively suppressing
pirates also plague responses to international terrorism. Pirates and terrorists
fall in the gray zone between military combatants and civilians. Thus the
antipiracy campaign and the so-called War on Terror both raise questions about
the legal status of conflicts between states and diffuse armed networks with
international operations. Issues that have impeded countries’ efforts on both
these fronts include: potential confusion about pirates’ prisoner of war (POW)
status, the use of prolonged detention, rendition of suspects to countries with
poor human rights records, claims of abuse by detainees, the difficulty of
proving in civilian courts cases arising from active military operations, and the
legality of “targeted killings” of suspected hostile civilians.
The legal obstacles come from international humanitarian law, including
the Geneva Conventions, human rights treaties, international refugee law, the
12. See Jamal Osma, ‘We Are Hungry. There Is No Government, No Economy, So It Is a
Good Way to Earn Money’, Times (London), Dec. 12, 2008, at 54 (“Pirates are usually in their
twenties, illiterate, attracted by the prospect of a lucrative life and are prepared to get rich or die
trying.”).
13. Jeffrey Gettleman, Somali Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 30, 2008, at A6.
14. See Pfanz, supra note 4.
15. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Authorizes States to Use LandBased Operations in Somalia, as Part of Fight Against Piracy off Coast, Unanimously Adopting
1851, U.N. Doc. SC/9541 (Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1851 Press Release] (statement
of U.S. Sec’y of State Condoleezza Rice).
16. Id.
17. See Jim Garamone, Mullen Shocked by Pirate Attack on Supertanker, Am. Forces
Press Service, Dep’t of Def., Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=51972 (quoting the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: “One of the
challenges that . . . you have in piracy clearly is, if you are intervening and you capture pirates, is
there a path to prosecute them?”); Nicolas Kulish, Legal Hurdles in West Slow Pursuit of Pirates,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 2008, at A8. In the same vein, Denmark, a leading maritime nation, said at a
U.N. meeting, that dealing with the pirates required “further deliberations on issues with regard to
detention and prosecution of pirates” and stressed the need for a “clear legal infrastructure, both
for extradition and prosecution of perpetrators.” See Danish Maritime Authority, Report on
the 101st Session of the International Maritime Organization (Nov. 20, 2008),
available
at
http://www.dma.dk/news/Sider/SessionwithDanishimprintheldinUN%E2%80%99sInternationalM
aritimeOrganization(101stsessionoftheCouncil).aspx.
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U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and other sources. None
of these measures were designed to obstruct antipiracy efforts; the conventions
were generally adopted without any thought about a resurgence of high seas
piracy. But the growth of international legal norms that limit state authority and
provide greater protections for individuals make it harder for nations to perform
the oldest and perhaps most basic law enforcement function in international
law: preventing piracy.
The failure of the antipiracy campaign offers lessons about one of the
most prominent and contentious issues of the day: whether the ordinary
criminal process can effectively deal with alleged, irregular combatants
captured abroad.18 The Obama administration has begun transferring detainees
from Guantánamo Bay, where they may have faced military commission
proceedings, to the mainland for trials before civilian courts.19 The failure of
similar measures in the battle against piracy suggests some of the difficulties
those plans might face. Western countries’ refusal to prosecute pirates they
capture stems from their concern about the difficulties of applying regular
criminal processes to such irregular forces.
The Somali piracy problem provides an excellent case study of the effects
of various international legal rules, because one would expect international law
to be more effective here than with terrorism and unlawful combatants. Piracy
is the paradigmatic crime for which international law authorizes and even
requires universal enforcement and punishment. Terrorism, on the other hand,
is not an international offense.20 Unlike the War on Terror, the antipiracy
campaign has not been the subject of intense domestic or international dispute;
a coalition of diverse states has sent forces to interdict Somali pirates. The only
state whose sovereign interests are at stake, Somalia, has made clear that it has
no intention of intervening on behalf of the pirates.21
Similarly, pirates lack ideological fellow-travelers who might draw
attention to their cases. Terrorists have political goals and thus sympathizers,
lobbyists, and often state support. Furthermore, the U.N. Security Council
resolutions authorized robust action against Somali pirates, both at sea and in
18. Daphne Eviatar, 9/11 Masterminds Could Face Trial in Federal Court, Wash. Indep.,
Oct. 21, 2009, available at http://washingtonindependent.com/64590/911-masterminds-couldface-trial-in-federal-court; see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, Op-Ed., The Terrorists’
Court, N.Y. Times, July 11, 2007, at A19.
19. Obama Plans U.S. Terror Trials to Replace Guantanamo Prisons, USA Today, Nov.
11, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-11-11-obamaguantanamo_N.htm.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 97 (2d Cir. 2003) (“We . . . further hold
that customary international law currently does not provide for the prosecution of ‘terrorist’ acts
under the universality principle, in part due to the failure of States to achieve anything like
consensus on the definition of terrorism.”).
21. See S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008) (noting the Somali government’s approval of the international
antipiracy effort contemplated by the resolutions).
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sovereign Somali territory. The Security Council passed five such resolutions
in 2008,22 more than on any other issue, including the Israeli-Arab conflict.23
Unlike terrorism, which is often directed at a particular nation, piracy directly
injures the commerce of the many countries whose trade passes through the
Gulf of Aden; states suffer direct losses and thus have private incentives to
intervene.
Moreover, the practicalities of fighting piracy are less daunting than
terrorism: pirates have little training, float around the seas in open boats, and
thus are easier to catch than terrorists. Finally, while Kenya is now hosting
trials of some captured pirates, many third-party states are not eager to try or
jail terrorists or other serious international criminals out of fear that their
friends might retaliate. Even U.S. allies sympathetic to President Obama’s
planned closure of Guantánamo refused to accept detainees from the base.24
Similarly, the Netherlands agreed to host the war crimes trial of former
Liberian President Charles Taylor, but refused to host his imprisonment if he is
convicted.25
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I describes the eruption of piracy
in the Gulf of Aden and the multifaceted international response. Part II outlines
the powerful international legal tools available to combat piracy. Part III
explains the countervailing international norms and considerations that have
undermined the effectiveness of the regime described in Part II. The
Conclusion places the failure to assert universal jurisdiction against piracy in
the broader context of universal jurisdiction against higher profile and more
politically sensitive offenses such as war crimes and genocide.26

22. See S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008); S.C. Res.
1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16,
2008).
23. See United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2008, available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions08.htm.
24. See Guantanamo Issue Looms Large for Europe, Deutsche Welle, Feb. 27, 2009,
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4059693,00.html (“Many European countries are deeply
concerned about having people who pose a potential security risk at large.”); Judy Dempsey &
Stephen Castle, EU Nations Divided On Taking Guantánamo Detainees, Int’l Herald Trib.,
Jan. 22, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/europe/22iht-germany.4.1
9609842.html; Peter Finn, Administration Makes Progress on Resettling Detainees, Wash. Post,
Aug. 20, 2009, at A3 (reporting that Uighur detainees have been transferred to Bermuda and
Palau, but not to European nations); Robert Marquand, Closing Guantánamo: Will Europeans
Take Detainees?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 23, 2009, at 5.
25. See Rory Carroll, Charles Taylor Flown to the Hague to Face War Crimes Trial,
Guardian (London), June 21, 2006, at 23.
26. This Essay does not advocate any alternative approach to either piracy or transnational
terror, but rather seeks explain the nature of the legal obstacles common to both.
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I
AN OLD PROBLEM REVIVED
A. The Piracy Epidemic
A series of spectacular hijackings in the Gulf of Aden propelled Somali
piracy to the forefront of international attention. In late 2008 and early 2009,
pirates hijacked a Ukrainian ship carrying battle tanks and arms to Kenya,27 a
Saudi tanker filled with crude oil,28 a chemical tanker,29 and numerous U.N.
ships carrying international relief supplies.30 Pirates also fired on an Americanowned cruise liner31 and even seized one of the few U.S.-flagged ships on the
high seas.32 These are some of the more notorious incidents in a rapidly
escalating epidemic.33 While attacks on international shipping in the Gulf of
Aden have only recently received significant public attention, they have been
escalating since the Somali government collapsed in the early 1990s,34 growing
in frequency and sophistication beginning in 2005.35 In 2008, the attacks
increased more than threefold over the previous year.36 The geographic scope
of the attacks also widened, with hijackings occurring in international waters
hundreds of miles offshore.37 The number of attacks in the first half of 2009
exceeded totals for all of 2008, with expectations of a further surge in the fall.38

27. Jeffrey Gettleman, Somali Pirates Capture Tanks and Unwanted Global Notice, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1.
28. Xan Rice, Pirates Anchor Hijacked Supertanker off Somalia Coast, Guardian
(London), Nov. 18, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/18/somalia-oil.
29. Philippine Tanker Hijacked By Pirates, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2008, at A14.
30. Jeevan Vasagar, Pirates Hijack Tsunami Aid Ship, Guardian Unlimited, July 1, 2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2005/jul/01/internationalaidanddevelopment.internationalnews.
31. U.S. Cruise Ship Escapes Fire from Pirates in Gulf of Aden, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2008,
at A14.
32. Mark Mazzetti & Sharon Otterman, U.S. Captain Is Hostage of Pirates; Navy Ship
Arrives, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2009, at A6.
33. See, e.g., Int’l Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Servs., Pirate
Attacks off Somalia Already Surpass 2008 Figures (2009), available at http://www.iccccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=352:pirate-attacks-off-somalia-alreadysurpass-2008-figures&catid=60:news&Itemid=51.
34. See Gettleman, supra note 10.
35. Peter Lehr & Hendrick Lehmann, Somalia—Pirates’ New Paradise, in Violence at
Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism 1–3, 16 (Peter Lehr ed., 2007).
36. Roughly 111 ships were attacked in 2008. Int’l Chamber of Commerce
Commercial Crime Servs., supra note 33.
37. The Sirius Star, a Liberian-flagged oil tanker hijacked in November 2008, was on its
way around the Cape of Good Hope—not through the Suez Canal—when it was hijacked more
than 450 nautical miles from shore. Robert F. Worth, Pirates Seize Saudi Tanker off Kenya, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 18, 2008, at A6.
38. Gregory Viscusi, Somali Piracy to Pick Up After Monsoon, Task Force Chief Says,
Bloomberg, July 27, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid=
aDZfefl5fcpM (noting that twenty-eight of the attacks succeeded in seizing a ship); Pfanz, supra
note 4.
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The September 2008 hijacking of the arms-laden Faina triggered a new
level of international concern. “With the seizure of the Ukrainian ship,” said the
U.N. Special Representative for Somalia, “a new line has been crossed. This act
should not and will not be rewarded.”39 The U.S. Navy diverted several vessels
from counterterrorism operations to corner the ship.40 One officer wryly noted
that in the pursuit, there was one destroyer for each pirate.41 Despite being
surrounded, the pirates eventually received a multimillion-dollar ransom and
escaped.42
The U.N. Security Council responded with a series of resolutions that
authorized increasingly broad encroachments into Somali territory. On
December 16, 2008, the Council passed its strongest resolution,43 drafted and
promoted by the United States, which extended previous authorizations of
military force to operations on the Somali mainland. This gave coalition navies
a tool that pirate hunters have lacked for centuries44 and marked the first time
the Council authorized armed action against pirates in sovereign territory.
B. The Grand Armada
In response to the piracy problem, NATO nations, along with other
powers, began sending warships to patrol the Gulf of Aden.45 By the end of
2008, twenty-three nations had committed vessels.46 The force was augmented
by the first naval force ever deployed by the European Union (EU),47 as well as
39. See Press Release, U.N. Political Office for Somalia, Somalia: SRSG Statement on
Piracy (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/VDUX7JXLA7?OpenDocument.
40. Jamey Keaten, Developed Countries Push Back vs. Pirates, Associated Press, Oct. 4,
2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/04/europe/EU-BattlingPiracy.php?page
=1.
41. See John Patch, The Overstated Threat, U.S. Nav. Inst. Proceedings, Dec. 2008, at
34–39.
42. Jeffery Gettleman & Mohammed Ibrahim, Somali Pirates Get Ransom and Leave Arms
Freighter, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 2009, at A6.
43. See S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008). Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter allows the Security Council to respond to threats to international peace by a variety of
means, including authorizing military force. See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41–42. Concerns raised by
other Council members led the United States to withdraw draft language referring to operations in
Somali “airspace,” though the United States maintained that the resolution still permitted entry
into Somali airspace for bombing and missile strikes. See U.S. Says Piracy Resolution Allows for
Air Strikes in Somalia, Agence France Press, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.infowars.com/us-sayspiracy-resolution-allows-for-air-strikes-in-somalia/.
44. See, e.g., Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars 237–45 (2003) (explaining that, during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britain and the United States were unable to stamp out
Caribbean pirates because, among other things, they lacked Spanish permission to seek out landbased hideouts in Cuba and other islands).
45. Keaten, supra note 40.
46. Xan Rice, U.S. Launches Anti-Piracy Naval Force to Combat Hijackings off Somalia,
Guardian Unlimited, Jan. 9, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/09/piracysomalia-us-navy.
47. Richard Norton-Taylor, British Warship to Lead EU Armada into Gulf of Aden,
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Russian and Indian warships48 and the first modern Chinese naval deployment
to another region.49 Yet, the results so far are not encouraging. Despite these
international efforts, the pirates still threaten to scare shipping away from a
waterway that carries 7.5 percent of the world’s seaborne trade and 30 percent
of Europe’s oil.50
Pirate attacks have grown even bolder since the international enforcement
efforts began.51 At a U.N. Security Council meeting in December 2008, world
leaders admitted that their antipiracy efforts had failed. While the international
community had done “quite a lot,” the Russian Foreign Minister observed,
“piracy went unpunished.”52 Secretary Rice agreed, saying pirates enjoyed
“impunity,” partially because of the problems with “the detention and
prosecution of captured pirates.”53
A U.S. Coast Guard admiral recently summarized the problems for
Congress:
Somali pirates to date have suffered few consequences, even when
they were apprehended. Frequently, the navies or other forces that
apprehended pirates were from states outside the region, and faced
significant legal . . . challenges . . . if they wished to bring pirates to
justice in their courts. Thus, pirates are often not held accountable for
their crimes and quickly make their way back to the Somali coast
where they continue their piratical activities.54
Similarly, the pirates lack reservations about capturing civilian crews. In 2008,
pirates took 815 crew members hostage off the coast of Africa; in the first half
of 2009, another 561 were taken hostage and 6 were killed.55 Subsequent Parts
will show how the naval campaign’s failure to combat these attacks can be
attributed in part to a lack of a legal basis for initiating hostilities against
Guardian (London), Nov. 20, 2008, at 29.
48. Viscusi, supra note 38.
49. Mark McDonald, Chinese Warships Sail, Loaded for Pirates, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26,
2008, at A6.
50. BBC News, The Suez Crisis: Key Maps, July 21, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middle_east/5195068.stm (“About 7.5% of world sea trade is carried via the canal today.”);
Somali Pirates Risk Choking Key World Trade Route, Reuters, Apr. 15, 2009, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSTRE53E2JR20090415 (“Around 30% of Europe’s
oil goes through the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea.”).
51. Nick Wadhams, As Somali Pirates Get Bolder, Policing Them Gets Tougher,
Time.com, Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1860404,00.html.
52. S.C. Res. 1851 Press Release, supra note 15 (statement of Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs Sergei Lavrov).
53. Id. (statement of U.S. Sec’y of State Condoleezza Rice).
54. International Piracy on the High Seas: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Coast
Guard & Maritime Transportation, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Rear Admiral William
Baumgartner) [hereinafter Baumgartner Statement].
55. World Pirate Attacks More Than Double This Year, SeattleTimes.Com, July 15,
2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009472715_apaspiracyworldattacks.
html. As of this writing, pirates continued to hold nearly 200 crewmembers from 11 vessels. Lori
Johnston, Q & A on the News, Atlanta J.-Const., July 21, 2009, at 2A.
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suspected pirates and daunting obstacles in prosecuting them.56
It bears noting that, in four instances, captured Somali pirates were taken
to Western countries for trial—but only when they specifically attacked that
state’s vessels. In one case, pirates seized a French yacht. Paris responded with
extraordinary vigor, sending commandos into the mainland of Somalia to
identify the pirates, and bringing them back to Paris for trial.57 Similarly, the
Netherlands is trying a group of pirates that attacked a Dutch-flagged vessel,58
and the United States is prosecuting the surviving pirate from the hijacking of
the Maersk Alabama, an American cargo ship.59 This suggests nations are
willing to accept the burden of prosecuting pirates when it involves their direct
and immediate interests—but not when it involves universal jurisdiction.
II
LEGAL TOOLS FOR FIGHTING PIRACY
A. Universal Jurisdiction
International law gives ample license for pursuing and prosecuting
pirates.60 For hundreds of years, international law has treated the pirate as a
hostis humani generis—an enemy of all mankind.61 Several factors account for
pirates’ special jurisdictional treatment.62 Pirates, by definition, do not
56. See, e.g., Gettleman, supra note 10; Jason Keyser, Guarded Shipping Corridor Limiting
Somali Piracy, Associated Press, Nov. 10, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
world/2008-11-10-3512568313_x.htm (reporting that sixty pirates have been released since
October 2008 alone “because no country has been willing to bring them to trial”); Mikkelsen,
supra note 10.
57. France Raid Ship After Crew Freed, BBC News, Apr. 12, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/africa/7342292.stm.
58. Bruno Waterfield, Somali Pirates Embrace Capture as Route to Europe, Telegraph
(U.K.), May 19, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/5350183/Somalipirates-embrace-capture-as-route-to-Europe.html. The Danish Navy captured and held the
suspects, but Denmark would not exercise universal jurisdiction over piracy. Sebastiaan Gottlieb,
The Dutch Want Pirates in Court, Radio Netherlands, Jan. 16, 2009,
http://www.radionetherlands.nl/currentaffairs/090116-piracy-trial.
59. Joseph Goldstein, Makin’ ‘em Walk the Plank, A.B.A. J., July 2009, at 16–17. The
United States charged the alleged pirate with additional attacks against other, unidentified but
presumably non-American vessels. See Benjamin Weiser, Somali Man Is Charged in 2 More Ship
Hijackings, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 2010, at A26. Given the existing charges of piracy against an
American vessel, the additional charges can be thought of as “pendent” or “supplemental”
universal jurisdiction, rather than naked universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, The
“Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 149,
180 (2009) (explaining unusual American piracy prosecution from the 1790s as a possible
example of pendent universal jurisdiction).
60. S.C. Res. 1851 Press Release, supra note 15 (statement of U.S. Sec’y of State
Condoleezza Rice) (observing that international treaties gave “sufficient legal authority with
which to apprehend and prosecute pirates, but that political will and capacity was often lacking”).
61. See Edward Coke, 3 Institutes on the Laws of England 113 (1797); Lassa
Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise § 272, at 325–26 (1905); see also Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 34 cmt. b (1965).
62. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What

KONTOROVICH 33 POSTAUTHOR

252

3/18/2010 8:36 AM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:243

discriminate among targets based on nationality and thus endanger the trade of
all countries.63 Their attacks also raise the prices of commodities, so that even
nations not directly involved in shipping suffer.64 Moreover, cargo ships are
usually owned by a corporation in one state, fly the flag of a second state, and
carry cargo destined for multiple other states. Further, ships often are crewed
by people from still other states.65 Piracy implicates the interests of all of those
countries.
Equally important, pirates are not endorsed by their home countries.66
This means that when some other state seeks to prosecute them, his or her own
country will likely not protest. Based on the example of piracy, modern human
rights law has attempted to extend universal jurisdiction to crimes with political
motivations and governmental perpetrators, such as war crimes and torture.67
Doing so has often raised the hackles of defendants’ home governments.68 By
contrast, no home government has much solicitude for pirates, who are
considered mere robbers.
B. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
ratified by almost every country in the world, codifies the universal jurisdiction
status of piracy.69 UNCLOS defines piracy more broadly than did the
customary law of nations by including “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends.”70 Thus, UNCLOS
makes assault and murder on the high seas universally punishable. Under the
Piracy Teaches About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 111, 139–53
(2004) (explaining the reasons that piracy was a universal jurisdiction offense).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that
piracy has long been subject to universal jurisdiction in part “because of the threat that piracy
poses to orderly transport and commerce between nations”).
64. For example, the November 2008 hijacking of a Saudi Oil tanker that held two million
barrels of oil (more than one quarter of Saudi Arabia’s daily exports) helped to raise global oil
prices more than one dollar, to fifty-eight dollars a barrel. See Raissa Kaslowsky & Simon Webb,
Somali Pirates Seize Saudi Tanker Carrying $100 Million in Oil, Wash. Post, Nov. 17, 2008, at
A24.
65. Id. (“A single piratical attack often affects the interests of numerous countries,
including the flag State of the vessel, various States of nationality of the seafarers taken hostage,
regional coastal States, owner States, and cargo owner, transshipment, and destination States.”).
66. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 Tex. L. Rev.
785, 793 (1988).
67. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s
Hollow Foundation, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 183, 184, 197–207 (2004).
68. See, e.g., Edward Wong, China Protests U.S. Rights Suit Against a Leader, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 5, 2000, at A4.
69. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105. For the comprehensive list of ratifications, see
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20
United%20Nations%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law%20of%20the%20Sea.
70. Id. art. 101(a). While the United States has not ratified the third and most recent version
of UNCLOS, it is party to an earlier incarnation with identical piracy provisions. See Convention
on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.

KONTOROVICH 33 POSTAUTHOR

2010]

PROSECUTING PIRATES AND TERRORISTS

3/18/2010 8:36 AM

253

older customary norm, only robbery counted as piracy, and thus more severe
crimes, such as murder, fell outside the scope of international law.71
UNCLOS also requires nations to combat piracy. The drafters’
commentary stresses that “any State having an opportunity [to take] measures
against piracy, and neglecting to do so, would be failing in a duty laid upon it
by international law.”72 It also favorably cites the Harvard Draft Convention on
Piracy, which went so far as to state that legal claims could be brought against
any nation that does not take sufficient steps to bring pirates to justice.73 Yet
Article 105 makes clear that prosecution itself is not obligatory.74
In some ways, however, UNCLOS makes fighting piracy more difficult.75
The central provisions of the treaty extend nations’ territorial seas to twelve
miles from the coast, a significant expansion of the traditional three-mile
zone.76 Because the international law of piracy applies only on the “high seas,”
UNCLOS has the unintended effect of reducing the area where piracy can be
internationally policed.77 This change allows pirates to take advantage of the
territorial waters of weak or failed states. The expanded territorial waters cause
even greater problems in gulfs, straits, and archipelagoes, where international
shipping must pass through an area bounded on several sides by sovereign
waters. Almost all Somali pirate attacks against international shipping take
place far outside that country’s twelve-mile territorial sea,78 and thus this
feature of UNCLOS cannot be seen as facilitating their activities. Moreover,
the Security Council has authorized international forces to “enter the territorial
71. See, e.g., United States v. Furlong, 618 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).
72. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 GAOR
Supp. (No. 9) at art. 38 cmt. 2, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l
Comm’n 253, at 282, A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.l [hereinafter Report of the Int’l Law
Comm’n].
73. See id. art. 38 cmt. 1, at 282; see also Harvard Research in Int’l Law, Draft Convention
and Comment on Piracy, 26 Am. J. Int’l L. 739 (Supp. 1932) [hereinafter Harvard Draft
Convention].
74. See Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the
Coast of Somalia, 30 Eur. J. Int’l L. 399, 408 (2009); NATO Parliamentary Assembly, The
Growing Threat of Privacy to Regional and Global Security, 169 CDS 09 E ¶ 37
(2009), available at http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1770.
75. For other potential complications related to UNCLOS, see infra notes 111, 206–210
and accompanying text.
76. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 3; see Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to
International Law 216–22 (describing transition from three- to twelve-mile seas).
77. Martin Murphy, Piracy and UNCLOS: Does International Law Help Regional States
Combat Piracy?, in Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism 161–63 (Peter
Lehr ed., 2007).
78. Two of the leading piracy problem areas are the Gulf of Aden (located in the Arabian
Sea between Somalia and Yemen) and the Straits of Malacca (in the Indian Ocean between
Malaysia and Singapore), both chokepoints for international shipping. See Dep’t of Energy,
Energy Info. Admin., Country Analysis Briefs: World Oil Transit Chokepoints (Jan.
2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html
(listing both the Strait of Malacca and Bab el Mandeb, the narrow strait separating the Gulf of
Aden and the Red Sea, as “world oil transit chokepoints”).
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waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy” and to “use . . .
all necessary means to repress act of piracy.”79
C. The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Treaty
An additional source of jurisdiction, which partially overlaps with
UNCLOS and existing international law concerning piracy, is the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA).80 SUA has 156 signatories, whose merchant marines
comprise roughly 95 percent of the world’s shipping tonnage.81 The U.N.
Security Council resolutions on Somali piracy have stressed the availability of
jurisdiction under SUA.82 Prosecution solely under the treaty, however, has
been limited to a single obscure case against a deranged cook who
commandeered a fishing trawler.83
SUA requires these signatories84 to prosecute anyone who “seizes or
exercises control over a ship by force or threat of force or any other form of
intimidation.”85 Jurisdiction is also readily available for countries whose
nationals are seized, threatened, injured, or killed during an attack.86 SUA has
certain advantages over UNCLOS as a basis for jurisdiction. First, it covers acts
in territorial waters, not just on the high seas.87 Second, it makes the exercise of
jurisdiction mandatory in some circumstances.88 Yet while SUA “obliges
contracting governments either to extradite alleged offenders or submit cases to
their competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution,” refusing to take
custody of pirates in the first place prevents such obligations from attaching.
UNCLOS, in contrast, requires nations to take active measures against piracy,
but does not mandate prosecution.89 A combination of the two treaties,
however, could require states to prosecute in some instances. Some states

79. S.C. Res. 1816, art. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008).
80. 27 I.L.M. 668 (1988), entered into force 1992 (also known as the “Rome Convention”).
The treaty was enacted in response to the Achille Lauro hijacking of 1985, in which Palestinian
terrorists hijacked an Italian cruise liner, having come on board as passengers. See Malvina
Halberstam, Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on
Maritime Safety, 82 Am. J. Int’l L. 269, 270–72 (1988).
81. See Int’l Maritime Org., Summary of Status of Convention: As of 31 January 2010,
http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247.
82. See, e.g., Sec. Res. 1846, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008).
83. See United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Eugene Kontorovich,
International Decisions—United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 103 Am. J. Int’l. L. 734 (2009).
84. 27 I.L.M. 668 art. 6(4).
85. Id. art. 3(a).
86. Id. art. 6(2)(b).
87. See id. art. 4.
88. SUA also explicitly gives jurisdiction over covered offenses to all signatory nations,
regardless of the nationality of the vessels involved. See id. art. 6(4). See also infra notes 207–19
and accompanying text.
89. See Treves, supra note 74, at 408; NATO Parliamentary Assembly, supra note 74
169 CDS 09 E ¶ 37 (2009).
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implement UNCLOS’s duty to “cooperate . . . in the repression of piracy” by
taking police measures against piracy.90 If patrolling states that are SUA
signatories take pirates into custody, they would then have a duty to extradite or
punish.
D. Trials in Other Countries
Although nations patrolling the Gulf of Aden have resisted bringing
pirates into their domestic courts, they have looked for other places to send
them. In 2006, the United States sent a group of pirates captured by the USS
Churchill to Kenya for trial in a closely watched test case.91 While their trials
eventually occurred without major complications and the pirates were
convicted,92 such transfers did not immediately become regular procedure in
Kenya. At the height of the piracy surge in December 2008, however, Britain
signed a memorandum of understanding with Kenya, formalizing an
arrangement whereby captured pirates would be turned over to the latter for
trial.93 In the subsequent months, the United States, the EU, and Denmark
entered into similar arrangements with Kenya94 As of mid-2009, roughly one
hundred pirates had been transferred to Kenya.95
Western nations see Kenya as conveniently situated to become an
informal regional piracy court.96 Yet Kenya is at best a stopgap solution.
Officials in Nairobi have made clear that their willingness to accept pirates is
limited.97 Kenya does not relish doing the rest of the world’s dirty work.98 The
detention and prosecution of hundreds of foreign Muslims who have committed
90. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 100.
91. Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for
Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1, 36 (2007).
92. See id.; James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword,
World Pol’y J., Winter 2008, at 46–47 (noting pirates received seven-year sentences).
93. Foreign & Commonwealth Office (U.K), Prisoner Transfer Agreements,
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/conflict-prevention/piracy/acks.
94. David Morgan, U.S. Delivers Seven Somali Pirate Suspects to Kenya, Reuters, Mar. 5,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE52480N20090305.
95. See Catherine Philp, Captured Somali Pirates Are Being Dumped in Kenya, Officials
Say, Times (London), June 12, 2009, at 41; see also Celestine Achieng, U.S. Navy Hands over 17
Pirates to Kenya, Reuters, June 10, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/africaCrisis/
idUSLA1052558.
96. Jeffrey Gettleman, The West Turns to Kenya as Piracy Criminal Court, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 24, 2009, at A8.
97. James Butty, Kenyan Foreign Minister Sheds Light on U.S.-Kenya Piracy Agreement,
Turkish Weekly, Jan. 28, 2009, available at http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/63755/kenyanforeign-minister-shed-light-on-u-s-kenya-piracy-agreement-.html (quoting Kenyan foreign
minister as saying the Memorandum of Agreement with the United States is “not an open door for
dumping pirates onto Kenya soil because it will not be acceptable”).
98. Id.; James Thuo Gathii, Kenya Has No Duty to Try Pirates Arrested Elsewhere, Bus.
Daily (Nairobi), Apr. 15, 2009, available at http://multimedia.marsgroupkenya.org/?StoryID=
252749&page=3&p=Lari (noting that trying pirates in Kenyan courts will slow domestic trials,
and describing Kenya’s agreements with Western states as efforts by the latter to “offshore” their
responsibilities for prosecuting pirates to Kenya).
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no particular crime against Kenya threatens to irritate its relations with
Somalia’s and its own Muslim populations.99 So far, however, patrolling
nations have been unsuccessful in their efforts to find other nearby states to
host piracy prosecutions.100 Indeed, the Seychelles, often mentioned as a
possible forum,101 has reportedly refused to prosecute pirates to prevent
reprisals against its nationals and vessels.102 The limitations of national
prosecutions have led some states to call for the creation of a specialized
international court, though such action seems far off.103
III
LEGAL OBSTACLES TO FIGHTING PIRACY
While international law has developed to include many new crimes, the
successful prosecution of piracy has grown more difficult than it was in the age
when ships were powered by sails. Although international law obligates nations
to repress piracy, many legal rules, practical constraints, and other considerations pull states in the opposite direction. These tensions involve conflicts
between older rules designed to promote international security and newer ones
aimed at protecting individuals from abuse by state authority. While some of
the legal problems discussed here are hypothetical, they can have a real chilling
effect on actions by American and other Western officials.104
99. Celestine Achieng, U.S. Navy Hands over 17 Pirates to Kenya, Reuters, June 10,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/africaCrisis/idUSLA1052558 (reporting on
tensions with Kenyan Muslims caused by the prosecutions).
100. Barney Jopson, Kenya Signs Deal to Prosecute Somali Pirates, Fin. Times, Dec. 12,
2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9b63b8e6-c7c4-11dd-b611-000077b07658.html?
nclick_check=1.
101. Elizabeth Pineau, France Asks Seychelles to Help with Pirate Trials, Reuters, Oct.
18, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/africaCrisis/idUSLI622681.
102. Kim Sengupta, Is Seychelles Turning a Blind Eye to Pirates?, Oct. 28, 2009,
Independent (London), at 2; J.E. Dyer, They Sell Pirates in the Seychelles, Contentions,
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/j-e-dyer/139812.
103. See S.C. Res. 1851 Press Release, supra note 15 (statement of Danish Ambassador
Carston Staur); id. (statement of U.S. Sec’y of State Condoleezza Rice); Frank Gardner, How Do
You Tackle Piracy?, BBC News, Dec. 13, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7782016.stm
(reporting that U.S. and French officers at a conference on piracy called for creation of
international court and prison for pirates); Germany Calls for International Court to Prosecute
Pirates, FoxNews.com, Dec. 23, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,471804,00.html;
David Osler, Russia Calls for a Piracy Court, Lloyd’s List, May 14, 2009,
http://www.lloydslistdcn.com.au/archive/2009/may/weekly-edition-14th-of-may-2009/russiacalls-for-a-piracy-court.
104. Currently, several former Bush administration officials face threats of prosecution for
their decisions surrounding the classification and treatment of suspected terrorist detainees. See,
e.g., Mark Benjamin, How to Build A Torture Commission, Salon.com, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2009/03/04/torture_commission/index.html; Editorial, A
Truth Commission for the Bush Era?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 2009, at A12; Bobby Ghosh, Leahy’s
Plan to Probe Bush-Era Wrongdoings, Time.com, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1879810,00.html. Their successors in office may be reluctant to take actions
that redound principally to the benefit of international shipping if there is even a small chance that
they may later be held criminally liable.

KONTOROVICH 33 POSTAUTHOR

2010]

3/18/2010 8:36 AM

PROSECUTING PIRATES AND TERRORISTS

257

A. Pirates as Civilians
Modern international law precludes the classic and most obvious
antipiracy measure: killing them. Under the classic law of nations, pirates were
simultaneously criminals and military targets. They were hostis humani
generis—enemies of all mankind—in the military sense, as well as offenders of
international law.105 They had the disabilities of both combatants and criminals,
without the privileges or immunities of either class. They could be tried when
captured, unlike regular combatants, but if encountered on the high seas, they
could be attacked and slain.106 Moreover, international law recognized that
returning pirates to port for trial could be extremely burdensome, and thus it
permitted summary shipboard proceedings and executions.107 In short, pirates
had a status much like unlawful combatants: they could be dealt with either
militarily or criminally at the enforcing state’s convenience.
Under modern international law, the situation is reversed. By the 1930s,
Western lawyers declared that anything short of a full trial or court martial was
“inconsistent with the spirit of modern jurisprudence.”108 Moreover, pirates are
considered civilians.109 Modern human rights and humanitarian law prohibits
extrajudicial killing of civilians except in self-defense.110 UNCLOS, a
codification of the modern law of the high seas, stipulates that the criminal
justice system is the only way of dealing with pirates.111 So, except in situations
of immediate self-defense, naval forces are prohibited from killing pirates and
must instead seek to apprehend them.
Given that pirates are civilians on board civilian vessels, patrolling navies
can do little until the suspects attempt to board another ship. International law
does not criminalize being on a Somali fishing vessel, even if the only pieces of
“fishing equipment” on board are AK-47s and RPGs. Consequently, navies

105. See Coke, supra note 61, at 113; Oppenheim, supra note 61, § 272, at 325–26 (1905).
106. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 71 (1838) (“As
therefore he has renounced all the benefits of society and government, and has reduced himself to
the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all mankind must declare war
against him[.]”); Oppenheim, supra note 61, § 278, at 330.
107. See Oppenheim, supra note 61, § 278, at 330.
108. See Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 73, at 853 (disagreeing with support for
summary proceedings expressed in draft report by League of Nations committee of experts).
109. See Treves, supra note 74, at 412–13; NATO Parliamentary Assembly, supra note 89,
¶ 40.
110. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3(1) (Third
Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter Common Article 2];
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 13 (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 (banning attacks on civilians); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 6(1)–(2), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (prohibiting extrajudicial killing). While the
Geneva Conventions do not necessarily apply to conflicts with pirates on the high seas, the
minimal obligations of Common Article 3 are widely thought to be generally applicable to all uses
of military force as a matter of customary law.
111. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105.
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must stop pirates in the narrow window when they speed toward a vessel and
have not yet taken the ship and its crew hostage. Once the pirates control a
vessel, responding nations and owners face overwhelming pressure to negotiate
with them.
The U.N. Security Council has expanded military avenues for combating
pirates, demonstrating that nations no longer regard the purely criminal
approach to piracy as satisfactory. The United States has won Security Council
approval for airstrikes of the kind it controversially uses against alleged
terrorists in Yemen, Pakistan, and Sudan.112 However, the Security Council
resolution requires that military action comport with international law.113 This
suggests that the resolution either does very little or that international
humanitarian law allows for targeted killings. Notably, the U.N. Security
Council opened the door to such action despite the harsh criticism of targeted
killings from the United Nations and human rights groups in nonpiracy
contexts, like terrorism.114
Forcefully dealing with pirates creates a serious risk that responding
nations will be accused of violating international humanitarian law. Attacking
pirate vessels on the high seas could open nations to accusations of illegal
“targeted killings” of civilians.115 In recent years international lawyers and
nongovernmental organizations have increasingly scrutinized tactical military
decisions for proportionality and other indicia of legality.116 In wars against
nonuniformed combatants and terrorist groups (so-called nonstate irregulars),
national forces have been accused of violating humanitarian law for not
successfully distinguishing between combatants and civilians in environments
where the former freely commingle with the latter.117 Such considerations have
undoubtedly deterred nations from using the Security Council authorization to
attack Somali pirates on land. Indeed, an American admiral in the Gulf of Aden
criticized the Security Council resolution as being likely to cause high civilian
casualties given the difficulty of distinguishing pirates from anyone else.118
112. See supra note 43 and accompanying text; S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851, ¶ 6
(Dec. 16, 2008).
113. Id.
114. Such charges have plagued the United States and Israel in their campaigns against
terrorists. See, e.g., Laura Blumenfeld, In Israel, A Divisive Struggle over Targeted Killing,
Wash. Post, Aug. 27, 2006, at A1.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., B’Tselem, Attacks on Israeli Civilians by Palestinians: Israel’s Obligations
in Responding to Rocket and Mortar Fire, http://www.btselem.org/english/Israeli_Civilians/
Israels_obligations.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
117. See id.
118. Lolita C. Baldor & Anne Gearan, Navy Commander Questions Land Attacks on
Pirates, Assoc. Press, Dec. 13, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
wireStory?id=6454447; see also Frank Gardner, How Do You Tackle Piracy?, BBC News, Dec.
13, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7782016.stm (The United States “did not yet have
enough intelligence on which individuals were involved to go after them without causing civilian
casualties”).
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Such concerns have proven warranted. In November 2008, India reported that
one of its frigates had sunk a pirate mother ship in the Gulf of Aden. News
soon emerged that the vessel was in fact a Thai fishing trawler that had been
captured by pirates; only one of the sixteen crewmembers survived.119
B. Pirates as Combatants
Given that combat operations against pirates are unlikely, judicial
remedies are seemingly the most promising alternative. Yet, as the next two
Parts describe, numerous obstacles stand in the way. Although pirates have not
been treated as combatants under the UNCLOS regime, Somali pirates could
perhaps claim combatant status with its attendant Geneva Convention
protections, especially in light of developments in international humanitarian
law over the past decade in relation to nonstate irregulars. Thus, the status of
pirates under the Conventions poses many of the same problems faced in
dealing with al Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations. The goal
here is not to defend the merits of such a characterization. Rather, it is to show
that there are arguments available to the pirates similar to those that have been
taken seriously in the context of al Qaeda detainees. Even if these legal claims
are ultimately not viable, their mere assertion by suspected pirates would
impede prosecution and increase the costs of detention. Thus, these issues may
help explain the lack of Western prosecution.
Both al Qaeda and the pirates engage in organized armed attacks, often
within the context of a broader conflict—like Afghanistan, for example. Yet
they do not fall naturally within the basic parameters of the Third Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which contemplates
traditional armies and well-organized militia forces.120 The drafters of the
Conventions had in mind neither large-scale international terrorism, which had
not developed at the time, nor large-scale piracy, which was thought to be a
thing of the past.121
Article 4(a)(2) of the Third Geneva Convention does recognize the role of
irregular “militias,” “organized resistance movements,” and “other volunteer
corps” so long as they abide by the laws of war and conduct themselves like a
traditional military organization.122 In the absence of these conditions, the Bush
administration declared al Qaeda beyond the protections of the Third Geneva
Convention. The response to that decision, perhaps the most widely criticized
international legal action of the past decade,123 suggests denying POW status to
119. See Mark McDonald, Ship Sunk by Indian Navy Had Been Hijacked that Day, Int’l
Herald Tribune, Nov. 27, 2008, at 2 (reporting that India claimed the frigate had been fired on
by the pirates aboard the trawler).
120. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 110, 75 U.N.T.S. at 135.
121. See Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 108, at 764 (observing that current
international law on piracy is “of little value” because “large scale piracy disappeared long ago”).
122. See Third Geneva Convention art. 4(a)(2), supra note 110, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
123. See, e.g., David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil over
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pirates would not be simple. Moreover, the United States previously extended
Geneva Convention protections to pirates without conceding that they were
legally entitled to them.124
Pirates satisfy the Article 4 requirements better than al Qaeda does. Pirates
have some local command structure, evidenced by the participation of dozens
of men in complicated seizures and their ability to divide large amounts of
ransom peaceably.125 Indeed, unlike ordinary criminal groups, they even have
spokesmen.126 Pirates carry arms openly, as the Geneva Convention requires of
militias, resistance movements, and other non-national forces.127 And while
they do not observe all the rules and customs of war, they often treat captured
crews reasonably, providing a basis for the argument that they would abide by
the rules of reciprocity. Few would argue that Article 4 requires perfect
observance of the laws of war for Geneva protections to apply.128 Such a
standard would make the Article a dead letter.
A broader question is whether pirates can be considered militias or other
organized resistance movements, and not just bandits. The situation in Somalia
is even more chaotic than Afghanistan in 2001. Because many Somali pirates
are based out of one of the two de facto independent provinces that have peeled
away from Somalia, it is very difficult to determine who, if anyone, falls under
Article 4’s definition of POWs.129
Furthermore, some pirates have claimed a political purpose: to drive away
foreign vessels that have intruded on Somali fishing grounds and dumped
poisonous waste.130 Normally the Somali navy would do this, but it no longer
exists.131 This account has an element of truth. When the Somali government
collapsed in 1991, commercial fishing fleets from around the world plundered
Somalia’s tuna-rich waters.132 Pirates often cite France and Spain as the worst
the Guantánamo Military Commissions, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 131 (2008); Stephen I.
Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of Powers After Hamdan, 16
Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 933, 951 (2007).
124. See Bahar, supra note 91, at 36, 45–46 (2007) (“In the case of Somalia today . . .
captured pirates would, and should, receive Geneva Conventions treatment, but they should also
remain eligible for prosecution.”).
125. See Gettleman, supra note 13.
126. Id.
127. See Third Geneva Convention art. 4(A)(2)(c), supra note 110, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138
(affording POW status on basis of abiding by this and other conditions); Michael H. Passman,
Protections Afforded to Captured Pirates Under the Law of War and International Law, 33 Tul.
Mar. L.J. 1, 24 (2008).
128. See Third Geneva Convention art. 4(A)(2)(d), supra note 110, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.
129. See id. art. 4(A)(1) (discussing armed forces of a Party to the conflict).
130. Najad Abdullahi, ‘Toxic Waste’ Behind Somali Piracy, AlJazeera.net, Oct. 11,
2008, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2008/10/2008109174223218644.html.
131. Alisha Ryu, Analysts Skeptical New Somali Navy Can Fight Piracy, Voice of
America, June 18, 2009, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2009-06/2009-0618-voa34.cfm?CFID=277283664&CFTOKEN=40212391&jsessionid=88309d93b2488c23b9fae
4512d2d6f47424a.
132. Gettleman, supra note 13.
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offenders when it comes to toxic waste dumping and illegal fishing.133 Of
course, the pirates have not limited their attacks to fishing or dumping; indeed,
they largely attack freighters. And they demand money, not political changes.
Yet their pretensions have received some international support. Muammar
al-Gaddafi, the Libyan leader whose nation headed the African Union at the
time, defended the idea of pirates as freedom fighters: “It is a response to
greedy Western nations, who invade and exploit Somalia’s water resources
illegally . . . . It is not a piracy, it is self defence [sic]. It is defending the
Somalia children’s food.”134 In this version, pirates sound a little bit like
“[i]nhabitants of non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading force, without having had
time to form themselves into regular armed units,” who can enjoy POW protections under the Third Geneva Convention.135 Indeed, as Western efforts against
the pirates increase one might expect to hear more such self-defense claims.
Apart from issues concerning the pirates’ status as combatants, there are
major preliminary doubts about whether the Geneva Conventions apply to the
Gulf of Aden situation at all, in particular whether the crisis in the region
qualifies as an “armed conflict between . . . High Contracting Parties.”136
Armed conflict is distinguished from “isolated and sporadic acts of violence”137
and “banditry.”138 There is a strong argument that an international armed
conflict exists in Somalia. Ethiopia, with the backing of the United States,
invaded Somalia in 2006 to overthrow an Islamicist movement and install a
transitional government.139 Ethiopian troops withdrew in January 2009, leaving
behind a contingent of African Union peacekeepers, who have been caught up
in bloody three-way fighting that shows no signs of stopping.140
Even if an armed conflict exists in Somalia, it is not clear that it extends
outside of Somali waters and into the high seas. Also, pirates captured by
nations patrolling international waters may not have “fallen into the power of
the enemy” within the meaning of Article 4.141 The uncertainty about the scope
of the armed conflict seems, if anything, less acute than similar questions raised

133. See French, Spanish Defence Ministers Launch Anti-Piracy Plan, Agence FrancePresse, Nov. 2, 2008, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1225635422.48.
134. Argaw Ashine, Gaddafi Defends Somali Pirates, Daily Nation (Kenya), Feb. 5,
2009, available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/-/1066/525348/-/view/printVersion//wjo0r1z/-/index.html.
135. See Third Geneva Convention art. 4(A)(6), supra note 110, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140.
136. See Common Article 2, supra note 110.
137. Protocol II, supra note 110, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 609
138. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-I ICTY (May 7, 1997).
139. See Int’l Law Ass’n, Draft Report on Meaning of Armed Conflict in
International Law (2008) (disputing British court decision treating Somalia as a
noninternational armed conflict).
140. Mohammed Ibrahim, Somalia Fighting Kills at Least 15, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2009,
at A6.
141. See Third Geneva Convention art. 4, supra note 110, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140.
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by the capture of alleged Islamic terrorists held by the United States. They were
seized in a variety of countries, often far away from any fighting.142 Thus,
while Article 4’s conditions may not be strictly satisfied, countries may still
feel the need to afford at least some Geneva protections to captured pirates.
Crucially, the Geneva Conventions apply in situations of uncertainty.
Article 5 provides that when there is “doubt” about whether a person captured
committing a “belligerent act” is entitled to POW status, such a person shall
enjoy POW status “until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent tribunal.”143 Thus, captured pirates could demand a hearing to assert
their POW status, and in the meantime would have to be treated as POWs.144
Because POW status is an individualized and highly fact-specific inquiry, each
pirate or group of pirates would likely require separate determinations.145 The
Geneva Conventions do not specify the requirements for determining POW
status. Consequently, United States courts have debated the issues extensively
in dealing with Guantánamo detainees. Such tribunals would be faced with the
novel legal and fact-specific issues about combatant status discussed above.
While POW status would not prevent pirates from being prosecuted for attacks
on civilian shipping, the added judicial procedures would increase the
uncertainty and cost involved in apprehending pirates.
C. Pirates as Defendants
International law encourages international prosecution of pirates.146
However, some developments in international and Western legal norms make
detention and prosecution difficult and potentially embarrassing for the forum
state, much like the prosecutions of suspected terrorists. Difficulties center on
establishing and proving who is a pirate. Unlike ordinary criminals, pirates are
captured by military forces operating in the field. Moreover, pirates neither fly
the Jolly Roger nor wear eye patches. Just as suspects detained by the United
States might not actually be terrorists or unlawful combatants, similar
misidentifications can occur when apprehending suspected pirates at sea.
Furthermore, the judicial determination of pirate status places additional
burdens on military forces.
Because there have been almost no prosecutions so far of pirates in
domestic courts, it is difficult to assess the costs and obstacles involved in such
efforts—though the unwillingness of nations even to try suggests the problems

142. See Charlie Savage, Obama’s War on Terror May Resemble Bush’s in Some Areas,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2009, at A20; see also Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, Military Sending
Foreign Fighters to Home Nations, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 2008, at A1.
143. See Third Geneva Convention art. 6, supra note 110, 75 U.N.T.S. at 142.
144. Id. art. 5 and Commentary, supra note 110, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140–42.
145. George Aldrich, The Taliban, al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants,
96 Am. J. Int’l L. 891, 896–97 (2002).
146. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, arts. 100–07.
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are significant.147 Several precedents show some of the likely obstacles. In
2006, U.S. warships captured Somali pirates and turned them over to Kenya for
trial.148 The U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG) officer who coordinated
the 2006 prosecution has described it in great detail.149 Kenya also took custody
of over 100 pirates captured by the United States and other countries between
2008 and 2009.150 Additionally, the United States has convicted a foreign
national under SUA for crimes against a foreign vessel.151 While the case itself
was of little international importance,152 the extraordinary measures taken to
prosecute a single defendant show why nations have not been interested in
prosecuting pirates. The following subsections discuss three of the largest
hurdles to domestic prosecution of pirates: (1) proving “pirate” status, (2) the
costs of trial, and (3) the potential embarrassments in detaining suspects.
1. Status as Pirates
Universal jurisdiction applies only to pirates. Captured Somalis insist in
court that they are not pirates but rather simple fishermen, erroneously seized
by a foreign navy.153 Because many pirates are in fact fishermen, their claim is
actually somewhat plausible.154 Piracy is not a full-time job.155 Simply having
weapons on a boat would not distinguish the pirates from many other seafarers
near Somalia. Furthermore, establishing the identity or even nationality of
captured individuals will be difficult, as they are unlikely to possess
identification.156

147. The same can be said about using civilian courts for Guantánamo detainees, a
development currently in its infancy.
148. Press Release, U.S. Embassy to Kenya, Capture of Suspected Somali Pirates, Feb. 2,
2006, http://nairobi.usembassy.gov/pr_20060202.html.
149. See Bahar, supra note 91, at 41.
150. Sarah McGregor, Aid Group to Defend Somali Piracy Suspects, Ensure Fair Trials,
Bloomberg, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid
=a5wQ7mzHZEEY; Sarah McGregor, Somali Pirates’ Kenya Trial, Bloomberg, Aug. 7, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid=aL9GurP5q2uc.
151. See United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Kontorovich, supra
note 83.
152. The case concerned the murder of a fishing trawler captain by the disgruntled ship’s
cook. See id.
153. Bahar, supra note 91, at 48; David McKenzie, Somali Men Accused of Piracy Face
January Trial, CNN.com, Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/12/11/
kenya.piracytrial/index.html (quoting lawyer for suspected pirates captured by Britain and turned
over to Kenya as arguing that his clients were fishing in Yemeni waters); Katharine Houreld,
Suspected Somali Pirates Appear in Kenyan Court, ABC News, Apr. 23, 2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=7407910.
154. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia Pirates Capture Tanks and Global Notice, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 27, 2008, at A1.
155. Suspected Pirates Face Trial, Kenya Broad. Corp., Dec. 11, 2008,
http://www.kbc.co.ke/story.asp?ID=54420.
156. See Travis Kavulla, Prosecuting Captured Somali Pirates Poses Challenges,
FoxNews.com, Nov. 26, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,457827,00.html.
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Such challenges must be taken seriously, because the alternative is the
detention of innocent civilians.157 To be sure, treating the detainees as innocent
fishermen would require giving credence to some dubious factual claims.158
However, the same is true of many Guantánamo detainees captured in
Afghanistan and elsewhere.159 They have claimed that they were innocent
passersby,160 aid workers,161 tourists,162 minors,163 or simply ignorant of the
nature and aims of the organization for which they worked.164 Regardless of
their plausibility, these claims won significant sympathy for the detainees.
Moreover, U.S. courts have held that because the power to detain depends on
the foreigner’s status as a combatant, detainees can appear before tribunals to
challenge the factual basis for being classified as a combatant even before a full
trial for their alleged crimes.165
In short, there are real difficulties in bringing a criminal case against
armed foreigners seized in remote parts of the world. Evidentiary problems
have already forced the U.S. Navy to release many of the pirates it seized in the
wake of its January 2009 agreement with Kenya.166 Even though they were
caught in response to a distress call from a commercial vessel, the evidence was
“not ironclad.”167 Other nations also release pirates at a high rate because of

157. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526–27 (2004) (holding that the legal status of
a detainee captured in Afghanistan is not “undisputed” where the detainee claims he is not a
combatant).
158. Matthias Gebauer & Holger Stark, Somali Pirate Trial Tests Limits of EU Mission,
Der Spiegel, Apr. 1, 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,616760,00.html
(“There are many indications that the [pirate] suspects’ testimony [that they knew nothing of the
nature of their boat’s mission] is nothing but lies to cover themselves, but proving the contrary
could be complicated.”).
159. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 3d 443 (D.D.C. 2005);
Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
160. Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59–61 (2002) (describing factual claims of
detainees).
161. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 511.
162. See Dep’t of Defense, Office of Admin. Review of Detention of Enemy Combatants at
U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review
Board in the Case of Lagha, Lufti Bin Swei, May 2, 2005, at 3, available at
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/660-lufti-bin-swei-lagha/documents/1/pages/
1089?scp=3&sq=lagha&st=cse#4 (“The following primary factors favor release or transfer: (a)
Detainee stated that he went to Afghanistan as a tourist. (b) During his stay in Afghanistan, the
detainee said that he spent his time fishing and recreating, and remained in Jalabad the entire
time.”).
163. Carol Rosenberg, Bring Guantanamo Detainee Back Now, Canadian Court Says,
Sun-Sentinel, Aug. 15, 2009, at 16A.
164. See, e.g., William Glaberson & Eric Lichtblau, Guantánamo Detainee’s Trial Opens,
Ending a Seven-Year Legal Tangle, N.Y. Times, July 22, 2008, at A12.
165. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
166. Sandra Jontz, 9 Suspected Pirates Freed in Somalia, Stars & Stripes, Mar. 4, 2009,
available at http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=61100; see also Questions
About Evidence Against Suspected Pirates, Int’l Herald Trib., Feb. 13, 2009, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2009/02/13/america/US-Pirates.php.
167. See Kate Wiltrout, Nine Suspected Pirates Set Free; Others Could Face Trials, Va.-
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such concerns.
2. Burdens of Trial
Ensuring that suspected pirates have the normal rights of a defendant in a
civilian trial would be particularly difficult given the remote location and
nature of the alleged crime. Military personnel have little training in
preservation and collection of evidence. For example, in the case of suspected
pirates captured by a German warship, the captain ordered their skiff sunk and
weapons dumped into the sea for security reasons, complicating the subsequent
Kenyan prosecution.168 Transporting the prosecution, defendants, witnesses,
and evidence to a foreign court would be burdensome and impede ongoing
interdiction efforts.169 Identification by victims can be difficult, as the
multinational crews of foreign-flagged vessels would have to be either detained
or returned from their homes around the world. Otherwise, by the time the trial
starts, the crew may be scattered around the world and simply unavailable.170
For example, in the one SUA prosecution on record, the Shi case, the vessel
was brought into a U.S. port and the entire crew held for months as material
witnesses.171 Yet this is not a feasible solution for Somali piracy, because
detaining crews would keep their vessels from continuing their voyages,
paralyzing international commerce as much or more than the underlying piracy.
Adding to the problem, domestic courts struggle to provide counsel and
translation services in the defendants’ Somali dialect, even in neighboring
Kenya.172 Providing translation services for testifying witnesses is also
problematic, further complicated by the fact that they often hail from a variety
Pilot, Mar. 3, 2009, available at http://hamptonroads.com/2009/03/nine-suspected-pirates-setfree-others-could-face-trials.
168. Gebauer & Stark, supra note 158.
169. Baumgartner Statement, supra note 54 (citing the “significant legal and logistical
challenges in transporting pirates, evidence and witnesses to appear in their courts” as a reason
patrolling navies do not take custody of pirates); James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Fighting Pirates:
The Pen and the Sword, World Pol’y J., Winter 2008–09, at 45 (noting the “great expense and
logistical and legal burdens of transporting the pirates to a Western country for prosecution”).
170. See Joint UNDOC/Eur. Comm’n Program, EU Support to the Trial and
Related Treatment of Piracy Suspects 3, 10 (May 2009) [hereinafter “EU Support”],
available at http://www.asil.org/files/AnnexE-ECAssistance.pdf (discussing obstacles to
prosecuting pirates, and noting that “locating [witnesses] and transferring them to the trying state
can be difficult, expensive, and time consuming”). See, e.g., Gebauer & Stark, supra note 158
(reporting that the trial of a group of pirates in Kenya may be dismissed if the judge requires
testimony of the captain of the victim vessel, who is outside the jurisdiction of the prosecuting
state).
171. See United States v. Shi, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1134 (D. Haw. 2003) (noting in a
prosecution under SUA that the case required arresting the entire crew of the victim vessel and
holding them without bail as material witnesses, measures which were only possible because the
ship had been taken into U.S. waters by the Coast Guard).
172. See Kavulla, supra note 156; Kenyan Pirates Trial Delayed, News24.com,
http://www.news24.com/Content/Africa/News/965/adaf2865499c43b986ce83300c40087e/06-022006-11-01/Kenyan_pirates_trial_delayed.
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of distant countries.173 For example, in the Shi case, the United States obtained
Mandarin translators for the entire crew of the victim vessel.174 Furthermore,
naval officers in active service would be called upon repeatedly to testify, as
the case would depend largely on the accounts of those present during the arrest
of pirates.175 Given that such trials can take months, this would in effect require
a dedicated cadre of officers.176
3. Allegations of Abuse
Kenyan prisons are at best grossly overcrowded and vermin infested.177 In
the two cases brought in Kenyan courts so far at the behest of Western powers,
the defendants alleged that they were tortured and denied religious privileges
by their captors.178 Given that most Somalis are Muslim, there is always a
danger that some elements might seize upon such allegations to incite antiWestern sentiment like they did regarding incidents in Guantánamo where U.S.
guards allegedly desecrated the Koran.179 Given the allegations of the Kenyan
prisoners, it appears that some pirates are taking a page from the Guantánamo
detainees’ playbook.180 Muslim leaders in Kenya have already likened the
piracy prosecutions there to the War on Terror as another “pretext” for the
government to “further engage in the human rights violation of Muslims.”181
One can expect that if prosecution becomes more regular, claims of abuse will
increase. Human rights groups have already started to raise these concerns.
Recently, Ben Rawlence of Human Rights Watch said of the agreement with
Kenya: “There is a very real risk that this agreement might be perceived as an
attack on Muslims. Anything that the United States does is subject to a high

173. EU Support, supra note 170, at 11.
174. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 3, United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2008)
(No. 06-10389), 2007 WL 1511823.
175. Id. at 10–11; EU Support, supra note 170, at 3.
176. Similarly, one of the major concerns about civilian trials for Guantánamo detainees is
the extent to which military personnel would have to come and testify. Compare Hamdi, 542 U.S.
at 534–35 (“[A]rguments that military officers ought not have to wage war under the threat of
litigation lose much of their steam when factual disputes at enemy-combatant hearings are limited
to the alleged combatant’s acts.”), with id. at 595–96 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Under the process
envisioned by the plurality, various military officials will have to take time to litigate [combatant
status] matter[s].”). The problems of prosecuting piracy show that concerns about diverting or
distracting military personnel through the judicial process for those detained by them are not
fanciful.
177. Gebauer & Stark, supra note 158.
178. See Bahar, supra note 91, at 41; Politics Influences the Jurisdiction for Somali Pirate
Trials, Deutsche Welle, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4198300,00.html
(reporting allegations that detainees were denied an Islamic diet by Kenya).
179. See Richard A. Serrano & John Daniszewski, Dozens Have Alleged Koran’s
Mishandling, L.A. Times, May 22, 2005, at A1.
180. See Bahar, supra note 91, at 41.
181. Kenya: Concerns Growing over Trial of Pirates in Kenya, Muslim News, June 16,
2009, http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/news/news.php?article=16363.
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degree of suspicion.”182 Notwithstanding the truth of these allegations, they
have negative consequences for detaining and capturing states.
D. Pirates as Refugees
Other human rights rules of Western countries increase the cost of
arresting pirates to the apprehending nation, while decreasing the cost to the
pirates themselves. For example, Britain reportedly instructed its ships not to
capture pirates they encountered because they could claim asylum under EU
human rights law once on board a British vessel, and certainly if brought to
Britain for trial.183 Suspected pirates could quite plausibly claim that they
would be subject to unfair trials, torture, and extrajudicial killing if they are
repatriated to Somalia, where law and order have largely collapsed. Thus, they
might be able to stay in a prosecuting country indefinitely if acquitted or upon
their eventual release from prison. Obtaining residency in a Western nation
would undoubtedly be seen as a benefit for most Somalis.184 Such “rewards”
would only exacerbate the piracy problem.185 Any nation that has ratified the
European Convention on Human Rights would have similar concerns. The
United States is also a party to treaties that require granting asylum under
certain circumstances, but the protections are not as broad as under European
law.186
E. Problems with Trial in Other Countries
With none of the capturing countries wishing to prosecute under universal
jurisdiction in their own courts, the only alternative to setting pirates free is
transferring them to another country. Several states have taken this course,
despite difficulties in finding a willing recipient state. Such renditions raise
legal problems themselves.
1. Nonrefoulement
The most obvious nation to transfer captured Somali pirates to would be
Somalia. Yet most countries do not see this as an option, both because of the
lack of a functioning central government and the significant probability that the

182. Alisha Ryu, Rights Group Questions US Deal to Send Pirates to Kenya, Voice of
America, Feb. 13, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-02-13-voa43.cfm.
183. Woolf, supra note 11.
184. Somali Pirates on Trial in Netherlands, DutchNews.nl, May 18 2009,
http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2009/05/somali_pirates_on_trial_in_net.php (reporting
that pirates on trial in Holland are happy to be there and wish to stay).
185. See Suspected Pirates Turned over to Yemen, CNN.com, Dec. 5, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/12/05/yemen.pirates/index.html; Derek S. Reveron,
Think Again: Pirates, Foreign Pol’y, Jan. 2009, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
story/cms.php?story_id=4626&page=1.
186. Aoife Duffy, Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-Refoulement in International Law, 20
Int’l J. Refugee L. 373, 378–79.
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transferee would be subject to unfair trials, cruel treatment, and the death
penalty.187 Some European governments have expressed concern that
repatriation would conflict with the sending state’s obligation of
nonrefoulement under various international treaties.188 Nonrefoulement
prohibits sending people to countries where they will likely be abused.189 The
scope of this norm has been a major subject of debate in recent years regarding
Guantánamo detainees, since terrorists, like pirates, often come from countries
with deplorable human rights records. Yet France, one of the more active
nations in the piracy campaign, regularly resorts to repatriation of pirates to
Somalia, relying on assurances that they will not be tortured.190 Similarly,
Denmark and Russia have handed over suspects to Yemen, another country
with a terrible human rights record.191
The United States and Europe have pursued another avenue—transferring
suspected pirates to neighboring Kenya.192 While the alleged pirates have no
connection to Kenya, they could be prosecuted there under universal
jurisdiction. The advantages of such an arrangement for the sending states are
obvious. Trials in Kenya proceed without the expansive protections of the
European Convention on Human Rights or the U.S. Constitution, and would
free the senders from some of the difficulties discussed in this Essay. The
proceedings are relatively speedy and informal.193
It is less obvious how Kenya benefits from such an arrangement. There
appear to be implicit financial benefits. The EU, along with a U.N. agency, has
187. See, e.g., Woolf, supra note 11.
188. See EU Launches Anti-Piracy Mission off Somalia, E.U. Observer.com, Nov. 10,
2008, http://euobserver.com/9/27248; Corey Flintoff, Prosecuting Pirates: No More Walking the
Plank,
Nat’l
Pub.
Radio,
Jan.
9,
2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=99169738; Woolf, supra note 11 (“The [British] Foreign Office has advised
that pirates sent back to Somalia could have their human rights breached because, under Islamic
law, they face beheading for murder or having a hand chopped off for theft.”).
189. See U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 3(1), G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984) (“No State Party shall expel,
return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”).
190. See French Warship Thwarts Pirate Attack, Nat’l Pub. Radio, Jan. 6, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99036159; Marcus Hand, French Navy
Captures 19 Somali Pirates, Lloyd’s List, Jan. 5, 2009, available at http://www.lloydslist.com/
ll/news/french-navy-captures-19-somali-pirates/20017603853.htm. The European Court of Human
Rights recently ruled that such assurances do not in themselves excuse refoulement. See Fiona de
Londras, Saadi v. Italy: European Court of Human Rights Reasserts the Absolute Prohibition on
Refoulement in Terrorism Extradition Cases, ASIL Insights, May 13, 2008, available at
http://www.asil.org/insights080513.cfm#_ednref3.
191. Russian Navy Transfers Detained Somali Pirates to Yemen, RIA Novosti, Feb. 18,
2009, available at http://en.rian.ru/world/20090218/120209688.html.
192. See Eugene Kontorovich, Introductory Note to Exchange of Letters Between
European Union and Kenya to Prosecute Pirates, 48 Int’l Legal Materials 747 (2009).
193. For example, judges once brushed away Somali defendants’ complaints of torture by
observing that that “they do[] not appear to be bleeding.” See Kavulla, supra note 156.
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agreed to a comprehensive program of judicial assistance to cover the cost of
pirate prosecutions.194 The program covers everything from salaries and travel
to office equipment, prison refurbishing, and other investments in the Kenyan
criminal justice system.195 Denmark, which signed its own agreement with
Nairobi, has also promised to compensate Kenya for the current financial cost
of the trials.196 Such assistance may go beyond covering Kenya’s actual costs.
One might speculate that agreements with the United States contain similar
understandings, or even promises of some kind of foreign aid.197
Thus, the Kenya trials may be an example of economic efficiency in
international jurisdiction.198 With this jurisdictional arbitrage, the international
community steers cases to the cheapest plausibly competent forum, while
sharing the resulting surplus with that state. Indeed, the EU involvement
contemplates so much bottom-up institution and capacity building, funded by
foreign sponsors, that Kenyan courts are becoming de facto, ad hoc
international piracy tribunals of the kind some have called for.
Turning Kenya into a clearinghouse for piracy trials also raises human
rights concerns. While Kenya’s legal system is superior to that of many of its
neighbors, it still has a huge backlog of cases and rampant corruption.199
Shortly after the U.S. and EU piracy agreements were announced, the United
Nations issued an extraordinary document calling for Kenya’s police chief and
attorney general to step down because of their complicity in the murders of
hundreds of people.200 Even as the United States relied on Kenya to prosecute
the pirates it had captured, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton criticized the
country for failing to control “ongoing corruption, impunity, politically
motivated violence, human-rights abuses and a lack of respect for the rule of
law.”201 The International Criminal Court has threatened to prosecute Kenyan
leaders if the country does not establish a special tribunal to deal with the
194. EU Support, supra note 170, at 1–2.
195. See id. at 16 (listing EU budget for the program as $2.3 million).
196. Kenya to Help Navy Chase Pirates, Copenhagen Post Online, Aug. 18, 2009,
http://www.cphpost.dk/news/international/89-international/46605-kenya-to-help-navy-chasepirates.html.
197. See Gebauer & Stark, supra note 158 (“In return [for taking pirates captured by
European navies], the Kenyans hope to get speedboats, helicopters and modern fire trucks.”); see
also Phillipe Naughton, Foreign Office Fury over Settlement of Guantanamo Uighurs in Bermuda,
Times Online (London), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article6480320.ece
(reporting that Palau appeared to accept Guantánamo detainees in exchange for $200 million in
foreign aid, and that Bermuda was compensated for its costs in accepting detainees).
198. See generally Eugene Kontorovich, The Inefficiency of Universal Jurisdiction, 2008
U. Ill. L. Rev. 389, 398 (2008) (discussing role of implicit compensation paid from one state to
another to facilitate efficient allocation of prosecutorial entitlements).
199. Sarah Childress, U.S. Warns Kenya on Human Rights, Aug. 6, 2009, at A7.
200. Derek Kilner, U.N. Official Calls for Dismissal of Kenya’s Police Chief, Attorney
General, Voice of America, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-02-25voa59.cfm.
201. Sarah McGregor, Clinton Softens Stance on Kenyan Tribunal, Bloomberg, Aug. 5,
2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid=aFTsF3Wq1K0c.
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bloody ethnic violence that occurred there in 2007.202 Much of the EU
assistance to Kenya aims at ensuring trials and “detention conditions which
meet international human rights standards.”203 Yet the EU will presumably not
provide indefinite oversight of Kenyan prisons throughout the pirates’
incarceration. Thus, using Kenya as a go-to state for piracy prosecution
suggests the United States and Europe will trade some prisoner security for
convenience and expedience. Such tradeoffs proved highly controversial in the
context of the War on Terror.204 It seems the Western public is not as
concerned with such issues in relation to suspected pirates.205
2. UNCLOS Article 105
The Kenyan arrangement may be further complicated by an obscure
clause in UNCLOS Article 105. Though the relevant language has never been
judicially construed,206 it arguably casts doubt on the permissibility of universal
jurisdiction by states other than the one that captured the pirates. The article,
which codifies universal jurisdiction over piracy, provides that “every State
may seize a pirate ship” on “the high seas, or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State.” While “every” state may seize pirates, Article 105
provides that the prosecution should be by “the courts of the state which carried
out the seizure.”207 The drafting history supports the reading that the article
precludes transfers to third-party states.208
To be sure, the possibility of such transfers never occurred to the drafters,
who thought large-scale high seas piracy a thing of the past. This underscores
the uncertainties that arise when courts must fit new security challenges into
international instruments that embody older paradigms.209 While Article 105 is
202. Id.
203. EU Support, supra note 170, at 3.
204. Amnesty International, Extraordinary Rendition, “Disappearances” and Secret
Prisons, http://www.amnestyusa.org/war-on-terror/extraordinary-rendition-disappearances-andsecret-prisons/page.do?id=1051263 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). In contrast, the rendition of terror
suspects to Yemen, Egypt, and other countries is the subject of a long-running litigation against
U.S. officials.
205. One obscure human rights group has challenged the transfer arrangements with
Kenya, but the overall reaction appears more muted than for the transfer of terror suspects. Parisbased Group Says Accused Somali Pirates Denied Rights, Voice of America, Aug. 27, 2009,
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-08-27-voa36.cfm; David Osler, Kenya Trials at Risk of
Breaching Human Rights Laws, Lloyd’s List, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/
home/blogView.htm?blogId=20001015481.
206. The U.S. transfer in 2006 was thought to be the first of its kind.
207. UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 105 (emphasis added).
208. See Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 72, art. 43 (“This article gives
any State the right to seize pirate ships (and ships seized by pirates) and to have them adjudicated
upon by its courts. This right cannot be exercised at a place under the jurisdiction of another
State.”) (emphasis added).
209. Similarly, one of the difficulties of the current War on Terror is fitting new kinds of
problems, like terrorist groups with global reach, into older legal instruments like the Geneva
Conventions.
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unlikely in practice to hamstring the Kenyan prosecutions, the uncertain
language may make other third-party states hesitant to accept such cases.210
Although UNCLOS does not explicitly authorize prosecution by thirdparty states, it does not expressly prohibit the practice.211 Article 105 could be
read to mean that states may not try pirates onboard the captured vessel.
According to the preceding article, Article 104,212 pirated ships retain their
nationality—a change from prior customary law. Read together with Article
105, this would make them an improper venue for trial.213 While this reading is
plausible, it is not clear whether a court martial on board a seized pirated ship,
as opposed to onboard the arresting one, was ever so common a practice to
warrant explicit disapproval in articles that otherwise say nothing about the
details of prosecution. There is nothing in the drafting history of the provision,
which was taken directly from the 1958 Law of the Sea treaty, to support this
interpretation.214
In short, the text of UNCLOS muddies the question of third-state
jurisdiction.215 The problems posed by UNCLOS help explain the emphasis
that military and diplomatic officials have been placing on SUA,216 which
allows any signatory state with personal jurisdiction over a defendant to
prosecute.217 While there is no state practice explicitly elucidating the
provision, in the Somali context, most states have not adopted the limited
reading of Article 105. This can be inferred from the transfer deals between

210. Int’l Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, Final Report, Piracy
off the Somali Coast: Workshop commissioned by the Special Representative of the
Secretary General of the U.N. to Somalia 7 (2008), available at
http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/somalia_piracy_intl_experts_report_consolidated.pdf (“Neither
the LOSC nor the High Seas Convention directly address the transfer of suspects ashore.”).
211. Compare Treves, supra note 74, at 408 (“The rule in Article 105 does not, however,
establish the exclusive jurisdiction of the seizing state’s courts. Courts of other states are not
precluded from exercising jurisdiction under conditions which they establish.”), with Milena
Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More Is Needed 14 (Cleveland-Marshall
Legal Studies Paper No. 09-178, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1468021 (“Under UNCLOS, the legality of this type of transfer is dubious.”).
212. See UNCLOS, supra note 8, art. 104 (“A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality
although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of nationality is determined
by the law of the State from which such nationality was derived.”).
213. See Report of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 72, art. 43 cmt.
214. 3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A Commentary
212–15 (Myron Nordquist ed., 1995).
215. Lawrence Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 Ann. Surv. Int’l
& Comp. L. 43, 54–55 (2009) (describing the view that noncapturing states lack jurisdiction as
“plausible” but by “no means compelling” given the longstanding customary norm of universal
jurisdiction).
216. See Countering Piracy, supra note 7; Baumgartner Statement, supra note 54 (“A
key component of the proposed consequence delivery system advocates application of the SUA
Convention.”).
217. See SUA art. 6(1), supra note 80, at 669 (allowing any state party to prosecute
defendants found in their territory); id. art. 8, at 669 (allowing suspects to be turned over to any
state party by master of vessel); id. art. 11 (allowing for extradition of suspects to any flag state).
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Kenya and numerous countries, to which there has been little or no objection on
Article 105 grounds. Yet given that in the current situation no state has any
self-interested reason for raising such objections (given their unwillingness to
try the detainees domestically), such an argument would most probably first be
made—and may yet be made—as a challenge to Kenya’s jurisdiction by the
defendants on trial there.
One way of reconciling the article’s language and current practice would
be to conclude that UNCLOS, and Article 105 in particular, does not preempt
or displace preexisting customary law, which may have given universal
jurisdiction authority to any state. (If the authority of jurisdiction of third states
comes from custom rather than treaty, this may have implications for their
ability to prosecute under their domestic law.) If Kenya’s jurisdiction comes
from custom, one would have to consider the current custom in modern
universal jurisdiction cases regarding which nation should exercise universal
jurisdiction.218 Modern practice and theory suggests a state with some
connection to the offender or conduct should prosecute over a state with no
connection.219
A limitation of universal jurisdiction to the capturing state would not be
anomalous as a policy matter. Apart from nations with traditional jurisdiction,
that state would usually have the greatest connection to the offense. The
purpose of universal jurisdiction is to enable nations that encounter suspected
pirates not to limit their enforcement efforts out of jurisdictional concerns. If
nations that make the arrest are unwilling to prosecute, then releasing the
defendant may be a proper outcome—a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. Auctioning prosecution to the lowest bidder, while defensible, can
also raise concerns about due process and related issues.
F. Inconsistent Assertions of Universal Jurisdiction
Prosecuting pirates may be difficult, but it is not impossible. Western
nations do not hesitate to bring charges against Somalis that attack220 their own
vessels. Indeed, European nations have used universal jurisdiction to prosecute
other crimes, such as war crimes and torture. Because these offenses, unlike
218. See Peter Csonka, Eur. Comm’n, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Shipping, Briefing on International Piracy (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
transport/maritime/events/doc/2009_01_21_piracy/jls_presentation_csonka_legal_aspects.pdf
(“[H]ad the universal jurisdiction over pirates been absolute any state of the world could have
issued arrest warrants against pirates. State practice, however, does not show any such trend, and
this bears out the ‘conditional’ nature of such category of universal jurisdiction.”).
219. See Principle No. 8, Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction, in Universal
Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under
International Law 23 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2006); see also Anne-Marrie Slaughter, Defining
the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts, in id. at 172–73.
220. See, e.g., Daniel Woolls, Spain Moves to Win Hostage Sailors’ Freedom, Associated
Press, Nov. 16, 2009 (reporting on Spanish charges against Somali accused of attacking Spanish
fishing vessel).
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piracy, take place entirely within the territory of foreign countries and often
involve governmental actors as defendants, they raise even greater difficulties
for putting together a trial. European countries’ avoidance of universal
jurisdiction over pirates, even when they actually have the pirates in custody,
raises questions about why they are willing to use it in what might seem more
difficult and politicized cases. Under the slogan “an end to impunity,” universal
jurisdiction seeks to address some of the most bloody wars, genocides, and
intractable ethnic conflict in the world.221 European countries have launched
prosecutions against political and military leaders of various distant
countries.222
Yet the countries at the forefront of expanding universal jurisdiction will
not use it to prosecute piracy even though it means allowing a major
international problem to go on unchecked. For example, Denmark has said that
it cannot punish pirates it captures.223 Yet it was one of the first European
countries to prosecute Serb officers for crimes committed against Bosnian
Muslims in the Yugoslav civil war.224 Similarly, when the Spanish Navy
captured a group of suspected Somali pirates, a judge ordered them released on
the grounds that prosecuting a crime that occurred thousands of miles away
would be “a bit disproportionate.”225 Just a week before, another Spanish
magistrate had launched an investigation into an Israeli strike on a Hamas
leader in Gaza in 2002.226
Ironically, Spain lacked personal jurisdiction over the Israeli officials,
unlike the pirates.227 Moreover, the evidentiary and other practical issues seem
221. See, e.g., Stephen Macedo, Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the
Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law 5 (2006) (describing “universal
jurisdiction as . . . part of a wider set of political and legal movements to expand legal
accountability and the global rule of law, and thereby to end impunity for serious crimes under
international law”).
222. Jonny Paul, Army Pays Price for Honoring Int’l Law, Jerusalem Post.Com, Nov. 30,
2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=122770
2364476.
223. Julian Isherwood, Pirates Released on Beach, Politiken, Sept. 24, 2008,
http://politiken.dk/newsinenglish/article572053.ece.
224. See Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal
Perspectives 128–29 (2003). To be sure, in European civil law jurisdictions, prosecution requires
an affirmative statute. The Danish universal jurisdiction law appears to authorize prosecution only
when it is mandated, rather than permitted, by international law. See id. But such statutory lacunae
can be easily corrected where there is a political interest in prosecuting.
225. Brian Reyes, Spain Judge Hands over Somali Pirates, Lloyd’s List, May 8, 2009,
http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/spain-judge-hands-over-somali-pirates-to-kenya/20017648702.
htm%3Bjsessionid=F27F836B87FE26232224D8DC27830EEE; Daniel Woolls, Spain: About
Face on Piracy Suspects, Chicago Defender, May 8, 2009, http://www.chicagodefender.com/
article-4353-spain-about-face-on-piracy-suspects.html.
226. Craig Whitlock, Spain’s Judges Cross Borders in Rights Case; High-Ranking U.S.
Officials Among Targets of Inquiries, Wash. Post, May 24, 2009, at A1.
227. The Geneva Conventions do not appear to authorize universal jurisdiction in abstentia.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth
Geneva Convention) art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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much more daunting when it comes to discerning what happened years ago in
an ongoing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, a situation in which,
unlike piracy, some of the alleged victims are actively involved in the conflict
and collecting evidence and testimony is inherently politicized. Additionally,
unlike with Gulf of Aden piracy, Spain has not been involved in keeping Gaza
safe; its judicial interest is unlinked to enforcement activities. Using universal
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes in politically fraught Gaza while rejecting it for
piracy is like a district attorney prosecuting only high-profile celebrity cases,
while letting ordinary murder and robbery go unpunished.
G. Summary
Capturing pirates raises a host of legal problems. If prosecution appears to
be a bad option—because of a lack of evidence, the cost of presenting the
evidence, the danger of asylum requests, or the strain on military operations—
the captor must then figure out what to do with the pirate. In the meantime, the
detaining power is stuck holding the foreign citizen captured abroad without
trial. In the shadow of Guantánamo, which turned the detention and potential
trial of alleged combatants into one of the most politically explosive issues of
the day, it is understandable that nations choose to ignore their international
obligation to fight piracy. Yet the same nations’ willingness to use universal
jurisdiction in more politically sensitive and legally difficult cases raises
questions about the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in universal jurisdiction
cases.
CONCLUSION
The failure of the international response to piracy is a cautionary tale
about the limits of international law. It is not that treating pirates as ordinary
criminals has proven ineffective. Rather, nations think it would be so difficult
to bring these criminals to justice that they are not interested in even trying. Or,
to put it differently, while the crime is nominally an injury to all countries and
the international legal order, individual states perceive few benefits to
enforcing the norm themselves. Indeed, nations treat any option as superior to
trials in capturing nations’ domestic courts: countries have experimented with
renditions to poor third-countries, sought authorization for military strikes,
discussed creating a new specialized international court, and even released
pirates shortly after their capture.
Ironically, many commentators have claimed that some problems of
dealing with international terrorists could be partially resolved by giving them
the legal status of pirates.228 They argue that just as international law allows

228. See, e.g., Burgess, supra note 6; Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law,
48 Harv. Int’l L.J. 121, 201 (2007); Ingrid Detter, The Law of War and Illegal Combatants, 75
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universal jurisdiction over pirates—violent nonstate actors with transborder
operations—it should extend universal jurisdiction to terrorists. The longstanding status of piracy as the paradigmatic international crime made it seem a safe
model to extend to a more difficult context. But while the treatment of piracy
does have lessons for the War on Terror, they are not lessons for emulation.
Even as international law has progressed, it has developed in such a way
that it cannot respond effectively to an atavism like piracy. Further, the
difficulties of prosecuting pirates are likely minimal compared to those
difficulties involved in prosecuting trained terrorists. The piracy problem raises
questions about the ability of the liberal international law regime to deal with
organized and violent transnational networks. The purely military justice model
for prosecuting hostile foreign irregulars that Guantánamo came to symbolize
has proven politically unacceptable in the United States and other Western
democracies. Yet the current piracy efforts suggest the great practical
difficulties in applying a civilian enforcement model to a large number of
individuals. The unattractiveness of either option suggests that many of the
foundational instruments of modern international law need retooling to meet
changing threats. If international justice fails against “criminal activity by
lightly armed thugs deployed from small boats and fishing vessels,”229 it will be
hard for it to deter more formidable wrongdoers. If a small number of robbers
cannot be brought to the bar of international justice, the war criminals of the
world have little to worry about.

Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1049, 1096–1101 (2007); Morris L. Sinor & Robin M. Blackwood,
Confronting Nomadic Terrorism, 52 Naval L. Rev. 98, 117 (2005). These arguments were
generally made before the current spike in incidents of piracy and the subsequent failure of states
to address piracy through judicial means.
229. Baumgartner Statement, supra note 54.
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